

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XXIV. No. 20.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOV. 13, 1813. [Price 1s.

609]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PRINCE REGENT'S SPEECH.—On the 4th instant, the Session of Parliament opened with a Speech from the Prince Regent in person, and in the following words, upon parts of which, after inserting them, I shall offer some remarks:—"My Lords and Gentlemen,—It is with the deepest regret that I am again obliged to announce to you the continuance of His Majesty's lamented indisposition.—The great and splendid success with which it has pleased Divine Providence to bless His Majesty's arms, and those of his Allies, in the course of the present campaign, has been productive of the most important consequences to Europe.—In Spain the glorious and decisive victory obtained near Vittoria has been followed by the advance of the Allied Forces to the Pyrenees, by the repulse of the enemy in every attempt to regain the ground he had been compelled to abandon, by the reduction of the fortress of St. Sebastian, and finally by the establishment of the Allied Army on the frontier of France.—In this series of brilliant operations you will have observed, with the highest satisfaction, the consummate skill and ability of the great Commander Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the steadiness and unconquerable spirit which have been equally displayed by the troops of the three nations united under his command.—The termination of the Armistice in the North of Europe, and the Declaration of War by the Emperor of Austria against France, have been most happily accompanied by a system of cordial union and concert amongst the Allied Powers.—The effects of this union have even surpassed those expectations which it was calculated to excite.—By the signal victories obtained over the French armies in Silesia, at Culm, and at Denevitz, the efforts of the enemy to penetrate into the heart of the Austrian and Prussian territories were completely frustrated.—These successes have been followed by a

[610

"course of operations combined with so much judgment and executed with such consummate prudence, vigour, and ability, as to have led in their result not only to the discomfiture of all those projects which the Ruler of France had so presumptuously announced on the renewal of the contest, but to the capture and destruction of the greater part of the army under his immediate command.—The annals of Europe afford no example of victories more splendid and decisive than those which have been recently achieved in Saxony.—Whilst the perseverance and gallantry displayed by the Allied Forces of every description, engaged in this conflict, have exalted to the highest pitch of glory their military character, you will, I am persuaded, agree with me in rendering the full tribute of applause to those Sovereigns and Princes, who, in this sacred cause of national independence, have so eminently distinguished themselves as the Leaders of the Armies of their respective nations.—With such a prospect before you, I am satisfied that I may rely with the fullest confidence on your disposition to enable me to afford the necessary assistance in support of a system of alliance, which, originating chiefly in the magnanimous and disinterested views of the Emperor of Russia, and followed up as it has been with corresponding energy by the other Allied Powers, has produced a change the most momentous in the affairs of the Continent.—I shall direct Copies of the several Conventions which I have concluded with the Northern Powers to be laid before you as soon as the ratifications of them shall have been duly exchanged.—I have further to acquaint you, that I have concluded a Treaty of Alliance and Concert with the Emperor of Austria, and that the powerful league already formed has received an important addition of force, by the Declaration of Bavaria against France.—I am confident you will view with particular satisfaction the renewal of the ancient connexion with the Austrian Government;

U

"and that, justly appreciating all the value
 "of the accession of that great Power to
 "the common cause, you will be prepared,
 "as far as circumstances may permit, to
 "enable me to support his Imperial Ma-
 "jesty in the vigorous prosecution of the
 "contest.—The war between this coun-
 "try and the United States of America still
 "continues; but I have the satisfaction to
 "inform you, that the measures adopted
 "by the Government of the United States
 "for the conquest of Canada have been
 "frustrated by the valour of His Majesty's
 "troops, and by the zeal and loyalty of his
 "American subjects.—Whilst Great
 "Britain, in conjunction with her Allies,
 "is exerting her utmost strength against
 "the common enemy of independent na-
 "tions, it must be matter of deep regret
 "to find an additional enemy in the Go-
 "vernment of a country whose real interest
 "in the issue of this great contest must be
 "the same as our own.—It is known to
 "the world, that this country was not the
 "aggressor in this war.—I have not hi-
 "therto seen any disposition on the part of
 "the Government of the United States to
 "close it, of which I could avail myself
 "consistently with a due attention to the
 "interests of His Majesty's subjects.—
 "I am at all times ready to enter into dis-
 "cussion with that Government for a con-
 "ciliatory adjustment of the differences be-
 "tween the two countries upon principles
 "of perfect reciprocity not inconsistent
 "with the established maxims of public
 "law, and with the maritime rights of the
 "British Empire.—*Gentlemen of the*
 "*House of Commons*,—I have directed the
 "Estimates for the services of the ensuing
 "year to be laid before you.—I regret
 "the necessity of so large an expenditure,
 "which I am confident, however, you will
 "judge unavoidable, when the extent and
 "nature of our military exertions are con-
 "sidered.—I entertain no doubt of your
 "readiness to furnish such supplies as the
 "public service may require.—I congratu-
 "late you on the improved and flourish-
 "ing state of our commerce, and I trust
 "that the abundant harvest which we have
 "received from the bountiful hand of Pro-
 "vidence during the present year, will af-
 "ford material relief to His Majesty's peo-
 "ple, and produce a considerable augmen-
 "tation in many branches of the revenue.
 "*My Lords and Gentlemen*,—I congratu-
 "late you on the decided conviction which
 "now happily prevails throughout so large
 "a portion of Europe, that the war in

"which the Allied Powers are engaged
 "against the Ruler of France, is a war of
 "necessity, and that his views of universal
 "dominion can only be defeated by com-
 "bined and determined resistance.—
 "The public spirit and national enthusiasm
 "which have successively accomplished the
 "deliverance of the kingdoms of Spain and
 "Portugal, and of the Russian empire,
 "now equally animate the German people;
 "and we may justly entertain the fullest
 "confidence, that the same perseverance
 "on their part will ultimately lead to the
 "same glorious result.—I cannot but
 "deplore most deeply the continuance of
 "this extended warfare, and of all those
 "miseries which the insatiable ambition of
 "the Ruler of France has so long inflicted
 "upon Europe.—No disposition to re-
 "quire from France sacrifices of any de-
 "scription inconsistent with her honour or
 "just pretensions as a nation, will ever be
 "on my part, or on that of His Majesty's
 "Allies, an obstacle to peace.—The re-
 "storation of that great blessing, upon
 "principles of justice and equality, has
 "never ceased to be my anxious wish; but
 "I am fully convinced, that it can only be
 "obtained by a continuance of those efforts
 "which have already delivered so large a
 "part of Europe from the power of the
 "enemy.—To the firmness and perse-
 "verance of this country these advantages
 "may, in a great degree, be ascribed. Let
 "this consideration animate us to new ex-
 "ertions, and we shall thus, I trust, be
 "enabled to bring this long and arduous
 "contest to a conclusion, which will be
 "consistent with the independence of all
 "the nations engaged in it, and with the
 "general security of Europe."—In its
 "tone of exultation the Speech is certainly
 "very moderate; but, where his Royal High-
 "ness speaks of the *conditions of peace*, he
 "is, in my opinion, not sufficiently explicit.
 "—He says, that "No disposition to re-
 "quire from France sacrifices of any de-
 "scription inconsistent with her honour, or
 "just pretensions, as a nation, will ever be
 "an obstacle to peace."—But, he does
 "not give us even a hint at *what* he looks
 "upon as being consistent with her honour or
 "just pretensions. We do not know, that
 "he may not deem the restoration of the
 "Bourbons and the Gabelle as consistent with
 "the honour of France, and as necessary to
 "the permanent tranquillity of Europe.—
 "If this, or any thing like this, be the scheme
 "now on foot, there is, perhaps, less prospect
 "of peace than ever.—The death of Na-



engaged a war of universal by com-
 ce.—
 thusiasm
 ished the
 pain and
 empire,
 a people;
 he fullest
 severance
 ad to the
 not but
 uance of
 all those
 bition of
 inflicted
 n to re-
 any de-
 onour or
 ever be
 Majesty's
 -The re-
 , upon
 ty, has
 sh; but
 only be
 e efforts
 large a
 of the
 perse-
 antages
 d. Let
 ew ex-
 ust, be
 arduous
 will be
 e of all
 with the
 -In its
 rtainly
 High-
 ce, he
 plicit.
 to re-
 ay de-
 ur, or
 ver be
 e does
 looks
 our or
 , that
 of the
 t with
 ry to
 —
 heme
 spect
 Na-

oleon, indeed; or his captivity, or even his total discomfiture and flight into France, might produce a counter-revolution, especially as so much power has, of late years, been placed in the hands of old royalists; but, short of some such event, there is no chance of the Allies being able to compel France to submit to any such terms.—The whole thing, the whole of the result, depends on *the disposition of the French people towards Napoleon*. He has so many fortresses at his back; he has such means gathering about him as he recoils upon France, that the Allies will never be able to push him into that country, if France is still disposed to support him.—This being my opinion, I cannot help thinking, that this was the precise time for England to declare explicitly, that she would not interfere in the imposing of any set of rulers, or any species of government, upon France. But, that, she would leave the people of France to do that which they always had a right to do: namely, choose their own government and their own governors.—The *deliverance of Europe* is a phrase too vague to convey any decided meaning. *What* is it to be delivered from? From *oppression*? Yes, the oppression of Buonaparté; but, *who* does he oppress? He oppresses the kings and princes, we know; because he takes from them their dominions; but, I should like to see it proved, that the *millions* of Europe will be delivered from oppression. This is the event to be desired; and, if this be not produced by the fall of Napoleon, I do not see any reason that any man in common life can have to wish for his fall.—Viewing him merely as an Emperor and a conqueror, no man need care a straw about his fate; but, if his fall is to lead to the *re-establishment* of all the old governments of Europe, in the persons of all the old families, in the plenitude of all the old and terrible oppressions on their people, ought we not to reflect well before we express our wishes, in too unqualified a manner, that his power may be annihilated?—The French revolution was productive of great calamities and crimes; but, no man can deny, that it has led, in many respects, to great good in the world; that it has tended to the enlightening of the people of Europe; that it has, in France itself, produced an entirely new way of thinking as to the rights of sovereigns and of subjects; and that it may yet lead to the emancipation of the enslaved minds of many millions.—To *superstition* it has given a blow, that the monster

will hardly recover. All the craft of priests will now scarcely be sufficient to bring mankind back to the state of degradation in which they were twenty-four years ago. It has put an end to the Inquisition; it has shook to atoms the monkish system; it has scattered the Cardinals and all their buffoonery; it has stopped the trade of the ministers of St. Januarius; it has, in short, given to that monster of all monsters, Superstition, a blow that she will never recover.—If Napoleon's power be destroyed, another season for *discussion* will arrive. The press of France, again let loose, will issue forth something to enlighten men. At any rate, there will be a short interval, during which men may *speak their minds*; and such an interval, though it last but for a month, is cheaply purchased by half a dozen years of war; but, to fight and pay, and to be *muzzled* at the same time, is a little too hard for flesh and blood to bear.—The fall of Napoleon is not going to take place like a dream. It will cause a *stir*, and a stir is always good for the mass of the people in all countries.—If the friends of freedom rise again in France, they will triumph, as they did before; but, it may be, that they will have a longer war to carry on.—As to “the *Declaration of Bavaria*,” of which the Prince Regent speaks, it was nothing but what every one expected, in case the Emperor of France should appear to be in serious danger. His German allies were what German allies have always been found to be; and I should not be at all surprised to see the coalition broken up now by some boon offered by Napoleon to one or other of the great Powers leagued against him.—This would be the very worst that could happen; for then, they would all sit down, he amongst the rest, and become rivals in nothing but oppressing their subjects; and, the people of France, after all their sacrifices, would still be doomed to submit for ages to a half-Austrian race of rulers. Much better than this it would be for Napoleon to be flung dead into a ditch, leaving France to the chances of a new revolution.—What the Prince Regent says about the United States of America being the *aggressors* in this war, I shall simply say that I dissent from; but, I take the liberty wholly to differ with him in opinion as to the *interest* of America being *the same with that of our Government* in the issue of this great contest.—It is not the interest of America, that our Government should be more powerful than it is. America must

wish to see our maritime power kept within bounds. And, if the present coalition against France were to produce the fall of Napoleon, and the diminution of the power of France, is it clear, that America would have nothing to fear? It is the interest of America, that France should be in a situation to keep England in check; and this is the principle, upon which the statesmen in America have always proceeded in their transactions with the Powers of Europe. —I do not know, why his Royal Highness should “regret the necessity of a large expenditure,”—seeing what a generous and rich people he has to draw upon, and a people withal so fond of war. They are panic-stricken at the prospect of peace. All those who have any thing to say as to public affairs, thrive by war, and dread nothing so much as its termination. I verily believe, that peace would cause a million times more tears to be shed, than all the butcheries of war have. And, what is to become of the army and navy? There is scarcely a family above the rank of day-labourers, who is not, in some way or other, interested in the continuation of war. Every new tax gives to the Government a fresh accession of power, in the attachment which its application purchases. Why, then, should his Royal Highness regret this large expenditure; especially when he must perceive, that in proportion as the people are loaded with taxes, they become submissive and patient? —What his Royal Highness says about the *abundant harvest* has puzzled me. He imputes it to the hand of *Divine Providence*. But, to whom do we impute *scanty crops*? If Divine Providence interferes to send us long and full ears and plump grains of corn, it must be Divine Providence who expressly blasts the straw and shrivels up the wheat; and I have never yet heard these evils imputed to any thing but the blights and mildews. —Besides, in what way is this abundant crop of corn to produce an augmentation in the revenue? Does it leave a quantity of it to be *distilled* into a taxable commodity? Is that the meaning of this part of the Speech? But, if people expend their money upon home-made spirits, will they consume an equal quantity of foreign? I cannot comprehend how an abundance of corn can add to the receipt at the Exchequer. —Rather than have indulged in these very doubtful speculations, I would, had I been the framer of the Speech, have availed myself of this fair opportunity of inculcating from such high authority, that

truth, so necessary to be universally known, that the price of corn and bread depends wholly upon the magnitude of the crop, and cannot be affected by any combination of individuals, nor by the mere state of war or peace. —If combinations of those who possess corn or flour, in any case, keep up the price of bread, why have they now suffered bread to become so cheap? If war could, in any case, make bread dear, why has bread become cheap, while the war is daily becoming more extended? —Farmers, in general, *fear peace*, as the cause of lowering the price of their produce; but, if they were to look back for a hundred years, and see, as they would, that corn has, upon an average, been full as dear in times of peace as in times of war, they would cease to desire that the sword may continue unsheathed. —This was a good opportunity for uttering a wholesome truth to the people, and it has been lost.

ECCE HOMO. —Mr. FORDHAM has sent me another letter, which, it appears, is to be his *last* upon this subject. —The reader will see, that he cites the passages from *Ecce Homo*, which he said imputed to the Son of God (for so Mr. Fordham will excuse me for calling him), an irregular passion for women, and also a propensity too abominable to be imputed to any man, without the fullest proof. —Mr. Fordham was called upon by OBSERVATOR to point out the passage, in which this atrocious accusation was contained, which passage is, it seems, as follows: “With respect to JOHN, who was a very fine lad, he became the favourite of his master, and received from him marks of distinguished tenderness.” —Now, really, though I had read this passage in the work along with the context, it never entered into my head, that any thing in the smallest degree improper was here insinuated; and, upon a re-perusal of this part of the book, I must say, that I think the charge wholly unsupported by the evidence. I wondered, indeed, that the charge should have been made by Mr. Fordham; for I could recollect no passage in the book, containing any such imputation, and my wonder was certainly not diminished, when I came to see the ground, on which it rested. —I am sorry, on one account, that Mr. Fordham has withdrawn from the controversy; because, I was in hopes of seeing from his pen something in answer to those parts of the book, which relate to interesting facts; and, in my disappointment, I

cannot help saying, that I do not think his reason for laying down his arms sufficient.

—He says, that, as *Observator* will have *nothing to do with religion*, whether it be the *true* religion, or whether it be the *false*, he, Mr. Fordham, will, *of course*, have nothing to do with the subject.

Nay, nay, Mr. Fordham; for *OBSERVATOR* told you, at the out-set, that he meant to show, that *all* religion was injurious to man. He told you so, and you took up the pen against him upon that very ground.

He was *wrong*, I know very well; but that was his proposition; and, therefore, if you chuse to decline a continuation of the controversy, you should have assigned some *other reason* for so doing.

—The real truth is, that it is impossible for an *Unitarian* to fight against *Ecce Homo*. For us, who take the *whole* of the Holy Scriptures to be true and to have proceeded from God, we are a match for him, who says that the *whole* is a fable or an imposture.

But, Mr. Fordham begins the contest in behalf of the Bible by asserting that a great part of it consists of *forgeries*.

—If one part is forged, why not another part? If several parts, why not the *whole*? —*Ecce Homo* can be in no fear of an antagonist like this, who begins the combat by surrendering the strongest of his positions.

—But, when he comes to be pitted against us, who maintain the authenticity of the whole book, to the very letter, he has something to do; he has to prove, inch by inch, that we are wrong, and to strip us of all the authorities of the great Councils of the Church, by which the Christian system was settled.

—Mr. FORDHAM says, that the Book is "*perfectly infamous*." Agreed; but, then,

I must say, that it is not more so than almost any one of the Unitarian Sermons, which make the Mother of Jesus to be a very so so person. They always affirm, that Christ was *not* the Son of God; that he was *not* conceived by the Holy Ghost; that his mother was *not* a Virgin when she was delivered of him, or, as the more polite phrase is, *confined* with him.

Now, we know, that the Bible tells us, that she was a married woman and *had not known her husband* at the time when she was so confined.

What, then, I ask, do the Unitarians impute to the mother of Jesus? —To be sure, and I have said it before, *Ecce Homo* is deeply censurable for treating Jesus in the manner that he does, with so much levity and ludicrousness, that one is, every moment, ready to burst out in laughter, were one not checked by the horror which

the profanity of the Book excites; but, still the Book is not *more* wicked than the sermons of the Unitarians, who, and with almost equal levity, scout the idea of God being born of a virgin and being hanged up between two thieves; and, this, by the by, they are now allowed to do *by law*.

—They are allowed openly to deny, to proclaim the falsehood, of that which not to believe, the law says will ensure us damnation. For the reader should bear in mind, that the Creed of St. Athanasius has the sanction of *Acts of Parliament*.

—I shall always regret this liberty given to the Unitarians. It was sapping the main pillar of our Church, which rests upon that very part of St. Matthew's Gospel, which Mr. Fordham calls a *forgery*, and which he says was not written till long after St. Matthew was dead and buried.

—What can *Ecce Homo* say worse than this? Verily, Mr. Fordham, the Unitarians are not the proper people to attack this writer, who, though he is wrong in his notions, deals fairly by his readers.

—As Mr. Fordham is now going off the stage, I must tell him, on my own part, that I did not think that he answered me about *the Devil*. That personage I said was absolutely necessary to the Christian system, and that for a man to pretend to be a Christian without believing most firmly in the existence of the Devil, was far more absurd than any thing which I had yet heard of.

—If there were no Devil, why should any one have come either to save us or instruct us? —In answer to this Mr. Fordham merely told me, that, as I appeared to be so very fond of the Devil, he wished me joy of him, and requested me to keep him to myself.

—This was *no answer* to my reasoning upon the subject, which, feeble as it might be, certainly merited a little word or two in the way of refutation.

—To be sure, I have never *seen* the Devil. There are very respectable persons, whose words ought not to be doubted, who solemnly declare that they have seen him. I really never have.

But, if I am not to believe in the existence of the Devil, merely because I have not *seen* him, why does Mr. Fordham believe in the existence of a God, whom he does not pretend to have seen?

—But, Mr. Fordham, after taking from us the Son of God, may pretty safely take away the Devil, the former being quite useless without the latter, and the latter without the former.

—In short, what is *religion* for, if there be *no Devil*? —I really wish for an answer to this question,

and I hope, as to this one point, Mr. Fordham will depart from his resolution and renew his correspondence.

THE WHIGS.—“Rake not up the ashes of the dead,” is a common saying, and that the Whigs are defunct every one must now allow.—These military successes, following, as they do, upon the heels of a coalition, of which England is the animating soul, give the death-blow to the very hopes of the *outs*. That Lord Liverpool; that he should be the great Deliverer, at last, after all the Pitts and the Foxes had failed! This is, indeed, something to cut down “the *Talents*.”—The “*march to Paris*” and the “*Jack Boots*” used to be talked of in ridicule; but, what do the Whigs say to them *now*?—I do not think, however, that his Lordship will actually march thither; but, he may send some one, perhaps, to perform the office for him.—At any rate, the *out* faction is defeated, and that gives me great pleasure. All their complaints against their opponents of want of *energy* are now blown into air. All the set may now go and mumble over their prayers backwards.—It is useless to talk. They can now make no impression. *Events* are against them. The Extraordinary Gazettes are their answer. They must be ready to gnaw off their very fingers. Lord Liverpool has delivered Europe!—Ropes and rat’s-bane must, I should suppose, be in great request.—At any rate, the complete annihilation of this perfidious and insolent faction must give pleasure to every one.—If the tide of success continue a little longer, we shall have no speechifying at all this winter. No one will dare dissent from any thing that the ministry may propose. If any one question their wisdom in any thing, the answer will be, “*Look at the continent!*” The Morning Chronicle says, that the war is now carried on upon “*true Whig principles*!”—But, really, this is too pitiful to notice seriously.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 12th Nov. 1813.

MR. FORDHAM.

MR. COBBETT.—Observator writes word that you have justly censured me, for the use of *harsh* and *illiberal* language. Very well. He then proceeds to accuse me of “*holy frenzy*,” and affirms that “*I am perverted in intellect*,” “*impatient*,” and “*fretful*.” And now, perhaps, you will also censure him for the use of *harsh* and

illiberal language on his part.—Observator has said, that Jesus *borrowed* his morality from the Ancient Philosophers. Has he *proved* it? I think, not in the least. It can never be understood that Moses belongs to the class of those who are usually denominated Ancient Philosophers or Heathen Sages. I will admit, that the ancient Getes were, and that the Chinese were also, and still are, believers in one God; and that many of the ancient sages taught excellent precepts of virtue. But let it be proved, that Jesus derived his system of morals, from any of these sources. It appears to me, that there is nothing in any ancient heathen writer, or teacher, that can be compared, for purity, benevolence, and capacity of universal application, with the gospel morality, AS A COMPLETE SYSTEM.—Observator says, “*I mean to have nothing to do with religion, whether it be the true religion, or whether it be the false.*” Then, of course, I will have nothing to do with this subject; and Observator may write whatever he pleases, unnoticed by me. As I have said, that Ecce Homo “*represents Jesus as a libidinous and debauched character, and vilely insinuates that Jesus was inclined to the most hateful, abominable, and unnatural practices*,” I will produce some passages from that work, and leave the readers to judge for themselves. When writing about the history of Jesus and the Samaritan woman, he says, “*The Messiah, who was not so delicate as the ordinary Jews, undertook the conversion of the female heretic, for whose sex and profession, we find in him a weakness through the whole course of his history.*” Page 123, in the note, it is said, “*It appears, notwithstanding all his gravity, that the ladies were the foible of Jesus; melancholy persons are not the least susceptible of this weakness,*” &c. &c. And in page 104, he says, “*with respect to John, who was a very fine lad, he became the favourite of his master, and received from him marks of distinguished tenderness.*” The book, in my estimation, is perfectly infamous. And here I finish my part of the correspondence.—Yours, &c.

G. G. FORDHAM.

Sandon, Nov. 8, 1813.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH PAPERS.

(Continued from page 608.)

—We answered it—that Austria was at liberty to renounce the alliance; that France

would not be hurt; but that she did not like those half measures, the common resource of irresolution and weakness. We accepted the opening of a Congress, although we foresaw that it would not have a prompt result for the present war, but as the means of keeping open negotiations, which would one day lead to peace. I will not here point out in what manner the Cabinet of Vienna exercised the mediation of Austria. I will not more dwell upon the details of the Congress at Prague; it has not existed. After the battles of Lutzen and Wurschen, Russia and Prussia would have been sincerely disposed to treat, if they had not had the hope of drawing Austria into their quarrel, and throwing upon her the burden of the war. Such is the vicious circle in which the Cabinet of Vienna has placed Europe; it pretended to be the bearer of peace to our enemies, by connecting itself with them; by taking upon itself the greater part of the chances, dangers, sacrifices, it encouraged them to war. It thought it led the Powers; it was led by them: they drove it to war for their own interest. Russia hoped, by raising the people from the Vistula to the Rhine, to erect between her and us a barrier of disorder and anarchy; that attempt having been unsuccessful, another mode offered, she seized it, she precipitated Austria into war. — Could the Austrian Cabinet think, after the serious proofs which it has had of the power of the French armies, to drive us in some months into our ancient limits? Twenty years of victory would be requisite to destroy what twenty years of victory has erected. But since such was her thought, why, after the peace of 1809, did Austria disband her armies? Why in 1812 did she ally herself with France? None of the proceedings of the Cabinet of Vienna escaped that of the Thuilleries. From the month of November the Austrian change of system was foreseen, and if the Government demanded extraordinary levies from the nation, on the treason of General York, because it made it foresee the defection of Prussia, it demanded fresh ones on the defection of Prussia, because it made it foresee that of Austria. It is this foresight which has spoiled all the combinations of the Cabinet of Vienna, and which has placed the French armies in a condition to make head against all their enemies. But, Sire, the coalesced Powers feel, that to attempt the accomplishment of the designs which at last they have ceased to dissimulate, they must make the greatest

efforts. It is necessary that at your Majesty's voice numerous battalions arise in the bosom of France, to place your powerful armies in a condition to carry on the war with new vigour; and in order to provide for all chances, when all Europe is in arms, when, independently of regular armies, the coalesced Governments call to battle the Landwehr, the Landsturm, and make every man a soldier, the French nation owes it especially to its safety as its glory, to evince fresh energy; it must consecrate to the conquest of a durable peace efforts proportioned to those which its enemies make to realise the projects of an ambition which knows no bounds.

(Signed) "DUKE of BASSANO,
"Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"Dresden, Oct. 20."

Documents relative to the Alliance.

Russia having resolved on withdrawing herself from the obligations of the peace of Tilsit, the conditions of which she had eluded towards the close of the year 1810; she then augmented her armies in 1811, formed assemblages of them on the frontiers of her Polish provinces, and in the commencement of the year 1812 she appeared determined and ready for war. — The Cabinet of Vienna took some insignificant steps, to engage Russia to keep the peace. Not only she had nothing in this matter to do with the French Government, whose pacific dispositions was known to her, but these overtures tended to a quite opposite result; for if any thing could cause an intention to war, it was her offer of uniting with us against our enemies, and proposing her alliance. (See No. 1 of the Treaty of Alliance.) — By the Treaty, Austria blended her political interests with those of France, whose principles she approved, and to which she associated herself by a guarantee without reserve. She engaged to furnish a contingent for the war; she adhered in the first place to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and in the case of this event taking place, she consented to the cession of Austrian Galicia on the condition of receiving an indemnity, the basis of which was already fixed; and, finally, she was assured of aggrandizements in territory, and the partition of States, which a fortunate war had put at the disposal of France. This was the end at which the Cabinet of Vienna aimed. Anxious to raise up enemies against Russia, she, by her agents, pressed the Ottoman Porte, Prussia, and Sweden, to make com-

and I hope, as to this one point, Mr. Fordham will depart from his resolution and renew his correspondence.

THE WHIGS.—“Rake not up the ashes of the dead,” is a common saying, and that the Whigs are defunct every one must now allow.—These military successes, following, as they do, upon the heels of a coalition, of which England is the animating soul, give the death-blow to the very hopes of the *outs*. That *Lord Liverpool*; that *he* should be the great Deliverer, at last, after all the Pitts and the Foxes had failed! This is, indeed, something to cut down “the *Talents*.”—The “*march to Paris*” and the “*Jack Boots*” used to be talked of in ridicule; but, what do the Whigs say to them *now*?—I do not think, however, that his Lordship will actually march thither; but, he may send some one, perhaps, to perform the office for him.—At any rate, the *out* faction is defeated, and that gives me great pleasure. All their complaints against their opponents of want of *energy* are now blown into air. All the set may now go and mumble over their prayers backwards.—It is useless to talk. They can now make no impression. *Events* are against them. The *Extraordinary Gazettes* are their answer. They must be ready to gnaw off their very fingers. *Lord Liverpool* has delivered *Europe*!—Ropes and rat’s-bane must, I should suppose, be in great request.—At any rate, the complete annihilation of this perfidious and insolent faction must give pleasure to every one.—If the tide of success continue a little longer, we shall have no speechifying at all this winter. No one will dare dissent from any thing that the ministry may propose. If any one question their wisdom in any thing, the answer will be, “*Look at the continent!*” The *Morning Chronicle* says, that the war is *now* carried on upon “*true Whig principles*!”—But, really, this is too pitiful to notice seriously.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 12th Nov. 1813.

MR. FORDHAM.

MR. COBBETT.—Observator writes word that you have justly censured me, for the use of *harsh* and *illiberal* language. Very well. He then proceeds to accuse me of “*holy frenzy*,” and affirms that “*I am perverted in intellect*,” “*impatient*,” and “*fretful*.” And now, perhaps, you will also censure *him* for the use of *harsh* and

illiberal language on his part.—Observator has said, that Jesus *borrowed* his morality from the Ancient Philosophers. Has he *proved* it? I think, not in the least. It can never be understood that Moses belongs to the class of those who are usually denominated Ancient Philosophers or Heathen Sages. I will admit, that the ancient Getes were, and that the Chinese were also, and still are, believers in one God; and that many of the ancient sages taught excellent precepts of virtue. But let it be proved, that Jesus derived his system of morals, from any of these sources. It appears to me, that there is nothing in any ancient heathen writer, or teacher, that can be compared, for purity, benevolence, and capacity of universal application, with the gospel morality, AS A COMPLETE SYSTEM.—Observator says, “*I mean to have nothing to do with religion, whether it be the true religion, or whether it be the false.*” Then, of course, I will have nothing to do with this subject; and Observator may write whatever he pleases, unnoticed by me. As I have said, that *Ecce Homo* “*represents Jesus as a libidinous and debauched character, and vilely insinuates that Jesus was inclined to the most hateful, abominable, and unnatural practices*,” I will produce some passages from that work, and leave the readers to judge for themselves. When writing about the history of Jesus and the Samaritan woman, he says, “*The Messiah, who was not so delicate as the ordinary Jews, undertook the conversion of the female heretic, for whose sex and profession, we find in him a weakness through the whole course of his history.*” Page 123, in the note, it is said, “*It appears, notwithstanding all his gravity, that the ladies were the foible of Jesus; melancholy persons are not the least susceptible of this weakness,*” &c. &c. And in page 104, he says, “*with respect to John, who was a very fine lad, he became the favourite of his master, and received from him marks of distinguished tenderness.*” The book, in my estimation, is perfectly infamous. And here I finish my part of the correspondence.—Yours, &c.

G. G. FORDHAM.

Sandon, Nov. 8, 1813.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH PAPERS.

(Continued from page 608.)

—We answered it—that Austria was at liberty to renounce the alliance; that France

would not be hurt; but that she did not like those half measures, the common resource of irresolution and weakness. We accepted the opening of a Congress, although we foresaw that it would not have a prompt result for the present war, but as the means of keeping open negotiations, which would one day lead to peace. I will not here point out in what manner the Cabinet of Vienna exercised the mediation of Austria. I will not more dwell upon the details of the Congress at Prague; it has not existed. After the battles of Lutzen and Wurschen, Russia and Prussia would have been sincerely disposed to treat, if they had not had the hope of drawing Austria into their quarrel, and throwing upon her the burden of the war. Such is the vicious circle in which the Cabinet of Vienna has placed Europe; it pretended to be the bearer of peace to our enemies, by connecting itself with them; by taking upon itself the greater part of the chances, dangers, sacrifices, it encouraged them to war. It thought it led the Powers; it was led by them: they drove it to war for their own interest. Russia hoped, by raising the people from the Vistula to the Rhine, to erect between her and us a barrier of disorder and anarchy; that attempt having been unsuccessful, another mode offered, she seized it, she precipitated Austria into war. — Could the Austrian Cabinet think, after the serious proofs which it has had of the power of the French armies, to drive us in some months into our ancient limits? Twenty years of victory would be requisite to destroy what twenty years of victory has erected. But since such was her thought, why, after the peace of 1809, did Austria disband her armies? Why in 1812 did she ally herself with France? None of the proceedings of the Cabinet of Vienna escaped that of the Thuilleries. From the month of November the Austrian change of system was foreseen, and if the Government demanded extraordinary levies from the nation, on the treason of General York, because it made it foresee the defection of Prussia, it demanded fresh ones on the defection of Prussia, because it made it foresee that of Austria. It is this foresight which has spoiled all the combinations of the Cabinet of Vienna, and which has placed the French armies in a condition to make head against all their enemies. But, Sire, the coalesced Powers feel, that to attempt the accomplishment of the designs which at last they have ceased to dissimulate, they must make the greatest

efforts. It is necessary that at your Majesty's voice numerous battalions arise in the bosom of France, to place your powerful armies in a condition to carry on the war with new vigour; and in order to provide for all chances, when all Europe is in arms, when, independently of regular armies, the coalesced Governments call to battle the Landwehr, the Landsturm, and make every man a soldier, the French nation owes it especially to its safety as its glory, to evince fresh energy; it must consecrate to the conquest of a durable peace efforts proportioned to those which its enemies make to realise the projects of an ambition which knows no bounds.

(Signed) "DUKE of BASSANO,
"Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"Dresden, Oct. 20."

Documents relative to the Alliance.

Russia having resolved on withdrawing herself from the obligations of the peace of Tilsit, the conditions of which she had eluded towards the close of the year 1810; she then augmented her armies in 1811, formed assemblages of them on the frontiers of her Polish provinces, and in the commencement of the year 1812 she appeared determined and ready for war. — The Cabinet of Vienna took some insignificant steps, to engage Russia to keep the peace. Not only she had nothing in this matter to do with the French Government, whose pacific dispositions was known to her, but these overtures tended to a quite opposite result; for if any thing could cause an intention to war, it was her offer of uniting with us against our enemies, and proposing her alliance. (See No. 1 of the Treaty of Alliance.) — By the Treaty, Austria blended her political interests with those of France, whose principles she approved, and to which she associated herself by a guarantee without reserve. She engaged to furnish a contingent for the war; she adhered in the first place to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and in the case of this event taking place, she consented to the cession of Austrian Galicia on the condition of receiving an indemnity, the basis of which was already fixed; and, finally, she was assured of aggrandizements in territory, and the partition of States, which a fortunate war had put at the disposal of France. This was the end at which the Cabinet of Vienna aimed. Anxious to raise up enemies against Russia, she, by her agents, pressed the Ottoman Porte, Prussia, and Sweden, to make com-

mon cause with France. (See the letter from the Prince of Schwartzberg to the Austrian Minister in Sweden, No. 2).—Thus, she did not only not endeavour to prevent the war, but, on the contrary, neglected no measures which, by adding to the security of the enterprise, was to lead France to attempt it.—But nothing could shake the Emperor's wish to avoid the war, and he never ceased hoping its attainment, until the very day on which the Ambassador of Russia, by a formal declaration, demanded, as an ultimatum, that the French armies, by retiring on the Rhine, should take to flight as if they had been vanquished, and demanded his passports.—The war commenced; Austria gave her contingent, composed it of corps and Generals d'elite, and exceeded the number of men which she had engaged to furnish.

Treaty of Alliance between France and Austria, of March 14, 1812.

His Majesty the Emperor of France, &c. &c. &c. and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. &c. &c. having at heart to perpetuate the friendship and good understanding which subsists between them, and to concur by the intimacy and force of their union, both in supporting a continental peace, or re-establishing a maritime peace; considering that nothing can be better adapted for producing those happy results, that the conclusion of a treaty of alliance, which should have for object the safety of their states and possessions, and the guarantee of the principal objects of their respective policy, have for this purpose appointed for their Plenipotentiaries, viz. his Majesty the Emperor of France, &c. &c. &c. the Duke of Bassano, &c. &c. and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. &c. &c. Prince Charles of Schwarzenberg, &c. &c. who, after having exchanged their respective full powers, agreed to the following Articles:—Art. 1. There shall be for ever, friendship, union, and alliance between his Majesty the Emperor of the French, &c. &c. &c. and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, &c. In consequence, the high contracting Parties will direct the greatest attention to support the good understanding so happily established between them, their States, and respective subjects, and to avoid every thing which might alter it, and on all occasions to promote their utility, honour, and mutual advantage.—2. The two high contracting Parties reciprocally guarantee the integrity of their present territories.—3. As a consequence

of this reciprocal guarantee, the two high contracting Powers will always act in concert, in those measures which appear most proper to maintain peace; and in the event of the States of the one or the other being threatened with invasion, they will employ their best and most efficacious good offices to prevent it. But as those good offices may not have the desired effect, they oblige themselves to mutually assist each other, in the event of that one or the other should be attacked or threatened.—4. The succour stipulated by the preceding article shall be composed of 30,000 men, of whom 24,000 shall be infantry, and 6,000 horse, constantly kept up to their full war complement, and a park of 60 pieces of cannon.—5. This succour shall be furnished upon the first requisition of the party attacked or threatened. It shall be put in march with the shortest delay possible, and, at least, within two months after the demand shall have been made.—6. The two high contracting Parties guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Porte in Europe.—7. They acknowledge and also guarantee the principles of the navigation of neutrals, such as they have been acknowledged by the treaty of Utrecht. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will renew, as often as may be necessary, the engagement of adhering to the prohibitive system against England, during the present maritime war.—8. The present treaty of alliance shall not be made public, nor communicated to any Cabinet, but by agreement between the two high contracting Parties.—9. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications of it exchanged at Vienna, within 15 days, or sooner, if it can.

Done and signed at Paris, 14th March, 1812.

Secret Articles of the Treaty of Alliance between France and Austria, of the 14th March, 1812.

Art. 1. Austria shall not be bound to furnish the succours stipulated by the 4th article of the present treaty, in the wars which France maintains either against England, or on the other side of the Pyrenees.—2. If that war should break out between France and Russia, Austria shall furnish said succours, as stipulated by the 4th and 5th articles of the treaty of this day. The regiments which are to form the same shall from this present time be put in march, and cantoned in such a manner that in less than fifteen days, to be dated from the 1st May, they may be united near Lemberg.

The said corps of troops shall be provided with a double store of artillery and ammunition, and likewise with the carriages necessary for the transporting provisions sufficient for 20 days.—3. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, on his part, shall make every necessary disposition for acting against Russia, at the same time, and with all his disposable force.—4. The corps of troops furnished by his Majesty the Emperor of Austria shall be formed into three divisions of infantry, and one division of cavalry, commanded by an Austrian General, to be chosen by his Majesty the Emperor of Austria. They shall act on the line which shall be prescribed for them by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and according to his immediate orders. They shall not at any time be divided, but shall always form a separate and distinct corps. They shall be furnished with their subsistence, in an enemy's country, according to the same mode which shall be established for the French corps d'armée, without making any alteration in the regime and usages in detail, established by the military regulations of Austria for feeding the troops. Such trophies and booty as they shall take from the enemy, shall belong to them.—5. In the event that by consequence of war between France and Russia, the kingdom of Poland should be re-established, his Majesty the Emperor of the French especially guarantees, as he does from the present time guarantee, the possession of Galicia to Austria.—6. In the event of its proving convenient to the Emperor of Austria to cede a part of Galicia for the purpose of its being re-united to the kingdom of Poland, in exchange for the Illyrian Provinces, his Majesty the Emperor of the French engages from this present to consent to such an exchange. The part of Galicia to be ceded shall be determined according to the combined basis of the population, extent, and revenue, in such manner that the two objects of exchange shall not be regulated solely by the extent of territory, but by its real value.—7. In case of an happy issue to the war, his Majesty the Emperor of the French engages to procure for his Majesty the Emperor of Austria such indemnities and aggrandizements in territory, which shall not only compensate for the sacrifices and expenses of his said Majesty, incurred by his co-operation in the war, but shall be a monument of the close and durable union which exists between the two Sovereigns.—8. If through hatred of the ties and engagements contracted by Austria with

France, Austria should be menaced by Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of the French will consider such attack as being directed against himself, and will immediately commence hostilities.—9. The Ottoman Porte shall be invited to accede to the treaty of alliance of this day.—10. The above articles shall remain secret between the two Powers.—11. They shall have the same force as if they were inserted in the treaty of alliance, and shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at the same place and at the same time with those of the said treaty.—Done and signed at Paris on the 4th March, 1812.

Copy of a Letter from M. the Prince of Schwartzemberg to M. the Count de Neipperg, Austrian Minister at Stockholm.

Paris, March 14, 1812.—I profit, M. Duke of Bassano, of an opportunity which offers itself, of informing you, before that you can have received intelligence of it by our Minister, that the ties of friendship and relationship existing between our Court and that of France, are this day going to be strengthened by a knot which ought to be a natural consequence of it, for establishing in a solemn manner the relations of intimacy and confidence between the two empires.—The great political event, furthermore, acquires a greater interest by taking place at the moment when a war is ready to burst out in the North. Our august master having determined in his wisdom, and being true to his system, to act in the most perfect concert with France, after having in vain exhausted every measure tending to the preservation of peace on the Continent with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, now finds himself on the point of taking an active part in a cause which has at length become his own.—In a state of things when that every means should be directed towards one common end, you cannot more essentially serve the interests of our august master, than by employing the credit which I know you enjoy with the Government to which you are accredited, to attach it to a cause to which a recent and painful remembrance, as likewise the favourable perspective of effacing it for ever by the re-occupation of so essential a part of the monarchy as Finland, must give a national character entirely particular to Sweden.—As it is possible that this letter may find you on the Continent, where I suppose you had the intention of proceeding, I cannot avoid recommending to you, not to give up the

possession of my letter itself, under *what-ever circumstances* it possibly may be, but to act with all your knowledge of business in the sense of the invitation which it contains; for to an enlightened military person, such as yourself, M. le Count, I will not undertake to enumerate the important advantages which might result in favour of the allied armies from a diversion in the extremity of the North conducted by an able and experienced General.

Documents relating to the Auxiliary Corps.

The auxiliary corps being arrived at Stonim on the 12th of November, 1812, changed all at once its line of operations, returned to the Bug, and thus facilitated the arrival of Admiral Tschitschakoff at Minsk, twenty-four hours before the French army. From this time the auxiliary corps, according to the public papers, did not cease to be in daily communication with the enemy. Towards the beginning of January, an interview was proposed to Prince de Schwartzenberg by General Wasseschikow, Aid-de-Camp to the Emperor of Russia; this was accepted, and was to have taken place between Ostolenka and Tykoein, but an accident prevented the Russian General from appearing there. He was replaced by the Counsellor of State d'Anstedt, the same who afterwards figured as a Plenipotentiary of Russia at Prague, and the conference was held at Warsaw. Every thing that has passed from the date of that moment between the Austrian corps and the Russian corps was in consequence of their acting perfectly in concert. The Austrian corps, retiring from station to station, successively abandoned to the enemy all the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw—refused to concur in the operations of the French army, whilst the Austrian Cabinet declared that this corps did not cease to be under the Emperor's orders. (See No. 1, a dispatch communicated by the Count de Bubna.) It secretly concluded an armistice with the enemy, which it dissimulated for a long time, and would not acknowledge its existence, until the moment when General Frimont announced that the armistice was broken, and made known his resolution of entering the Austrian territory—and the convention concluded with Saxony (see 28, 2 of the text of that convention), without the French Government having the least knowledge of it, for sending the Polish corps disarmed into the rear of the French army; the presence of which

in a part of Poland caused a lively inquietude to Russia.

No. I.—*Passage extracted from a Dispatch addressed to Count Bubna (communicated by M. Difforet, on the 5th Feb.)*

You will also declare to the Emperor that the auxiliary corps being, according to the treaty, under the immediate command of the said M. (the King of Naples), it depended upon him to point out the place where our auxiliary corps should be called to place itself, and that our august Master did not order the point of retreat towards Galicia; that because his Majesty had consented that the auxiliary corps should follow that movement, that corps did not the less remain under the *immediate* command of the French Emperor, and it will depend upon his Majesty to send to it such orders by the Major-General as he may judge fit. You will explicitly state, that whilst it is approaching other Austrian corps d'armée, we are far from confounding the *nature* and the *end* of our different corps d'armée.

No. II.—Is a convention concluded between Austria and Saxony, for permitting the troops under General Poniatowski, on leaving the Duchy of Warsaw, for traversing Galicia, Moravia, and Bohemia. It consists of 14 articles, stipulates that they shall not pass in columns of more than 3,400 infantry, and 1,000 horse at once, and states the sum to be daily paid for the support of each soldier.

Documents relative to the Proceedings of the Cabinet of Vienna, to the opening of the Campaign.

The disasters which the excessive rigour of the season caused the French army in Russia were scarcely known at Vienna, and already the Cabinet took a change of system. (See the Letters from Count Otto, of the 16th and 18th December, Nos. 1 and 2). But it wanted time to arm.—It opened negotiations, and proposed its interposition to the belligerent parties. The Emperor, who only desired peace, made no difficulty of accepting the mediation of an ally. The Cabinet of Vienna evinced the most lively joy; it applauded the Emperor's views, and found them generous. It appeared to enter upon that career where it particularly loved to serve the interests of France; it declared that it was immovable in its system—'That the alliance founded on the most natural, permanent, and the most essentially necessary interests, should be as everlasting as the motives which had

caused it; that it was that which it had sought for, after having deeply reflected; that if it was to be again done, it would wish it such as it was; that it did not dread France but Russia. It protested the disinterestedness of Austria, which wished nothing for herself, and who would consider the most important aggrandizements too dearly purchased at the expense of a campaign.—It was but to see the moment when the Russians would not adhere to moderate propositions, to employ against them, not the auxiliary corps stipulated by the treaty of alliance—not a corps of 70,000 men, but all the forces of the monarchy. It in short engaged not to act in any way derogatory to the Emperor, to take no steps without his knowledge, and to communicate all its proceedings to him, whether to lead to negotiations, or respecting the armaments which were to sustain Austria in her new attitude. The Cabinet of Vienna was prodigal of those assurances to the French Ambassador. They were the object of the extraordinary mission of Count Bubna to Paris. It sent the Prince of Schwartzenberg there, 'To give the Emperor a striking proof of its dispositions, by making appear at the Court of France the Commandant of the Austrian Corps, proceeding to his Chief to receive his orders.' In fine, it prohibited its agent from making use of the word mediation, whilst that it was employing the mediation of an Ally, who aspires to accelerate the term of the war. (See Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, of Letters from Count Bubna). Russia accepted this friendly mediation of a Power at war with her. She remarked, 'That forms and usages were contrary to this concession, but she passed on those considerations, for having given Austria a proof of her confidence and of her esteem.' The Cabinets previously understood each other; this language was concerted. At the same time when Austria proposed her mediation to Russia, she made an offer of it to England, who did not fail to observe, 'That the constant relations of Austria with France were opposed to the success of this step.' It had, in effect, no result.—Count de Narbonne was named Ambassador at Vienna. He arrived at his post in the latter end of March. Then the combined armies had arrived on the Elbe. The Austrian Cabinet proceeded more freely in its system. The French Ambassador wrote on the 1st April—'We cannot dissimulate that Austria, whether she persists in the

alliance, or whether she declares against us, can in either case but hold the same language and the same conduct to the denouement.'—Prince Schwartzenberg, after long delays, had proceeded to Paris. This Commandant of the auxiliary corps, who came to his Chief to take his orders, and was still there when the Emperor, notwithstanding the declarations of which that Ambassador was the bearer, felt the necessity of pressing the events of war, to arrest, were it possible, the determinations towards which Austria marched with hasty steps. Prince Schwartzenberg, who remained at Paris after the Emperor's departure, on the 22d April gave in a note, in which he still declared, that if some of the stipulations of the alliance were not applicable to the circumstances of the moment, the Emperor Francis did not wish to alter any of its basis (see the Prince of Schwartzenberg's note, 13). He at the same time verbally repeated to the Duke of Bassano, the declaration which he had already made to the Emperor, that when the orders reached the auxiliary corps, he did not doubt their being obeyed by the provisional commandant.—At the same time the French Ambassador at Vienna having been charged to inform the Cabinet, that the moment the renewal of hostilities should be resolved upon orders would be sent to the auxiliary corps to act in concert, asked if they would be punctually executed. Receiving but vague and captious replies, he thought it his duty to prove by facts the real dispositions of the Cabinet. He demanded a formal explanation by a note dated 21st April. (See note 14.)—Count Metternich replied on the 26th. His reply left no doubt respecting the inclination of the Austrian Cabinet not to fulfil its obligation. (See No. 15.)—The Emperor had just triumphed at Lutzen when he received the courier, who brought him the reply of Austria. From this moment the projects of the Cabinet of Vienna were unveiled.

Declaration of Count Metternich, dated Prague, Aug. 12.

The undersigned, Minister of State, and for Foreign Affairs, is charged by an express order from his august Master to make the following Declaration to his Excellency the Count de Narbonne, Ambassador from his Majesty the Emperor of France, King of Italy.—Since the last peace signed with France, in October 1809, his Imperial Majesty and Apostolic King has directed all his solicitude, not only to the establishing

with that Power relations of friendship and confidence, which she made the basis of her political system, but made use of those relations to support the peace and order of Europe. She flattered herself that this intimate connexion, cemented by family alliance, contracted with the Emperor of the French, would contribute to give it, in its political proceedings, the only influence it was jealous to acquire, that which tended to communicate to the Cabinets of Europe, that spirit of moderation, that respect for the rights and the possessions of independent States, which she herself possessed. —His Imperial Majesty was not long able to indulge in so flattering hopes; a year had scarcely elapsed, from the epoch which seemed to have raised the military glory of the Sovereign of France to the highest pitch, and nothing appeared to be wanting to his prosperity, as far as depended upon his attitude and his influence abroad. —When new additions to the French territories, of States till then independent, new parcelling out and dismemberments of the empire of Germany (A) awoke the apprehensions of Powers, and prepared, by their fatal re-action upon the North of Europe, the war which was kindled in 1812, between France and Russia (B). —The French Cabinet knows better than any other how much the Emperor of Austria had at heart to prevent its breaking out, by all the ways which his interest for the two Powers, and for those who would find themselves drawn into the great contest which was preparing, dictated to him. —It is not him which Europe will ever accuse for the incalculable evils which have been the consequence of it (C). —In this state of things, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor, not being able to preserve to his people the benefits of peace, and maintain a happy neutrality in the midst of that vast field of battle, which on all sides surrounded his States, only consulted in the part he adopted, that his fidelity to relations so recently established, and the hope he loved to still cherish, that his alliance with France, by affording him the most certain means of having prudent councils hearkened to, would place bounds to inevitable evils, and serve the cause of the return of peace to Europe (D). —Unfortunately, it has not thus happened; neither the brilliant successes of 1812, nor the unexampled misfortunes which marked the conclusion of it, were able to bring back into the councils of the French Government that spirit of moderation which would

have turned the first to advantage, and diminished the effort of the latter (E). —His Majesty did not the less on that account take advantage of the moment when both parties, reciprocally exhausted, had slackened the active operations of war, to convey to the belligerent powers pacific sentiments, which he still hoped to see received on either part, with that sincerity which had dictated them. —Persuaded, nevertheless, that he would only be able to make them be listened to by supporting them with forces, which would promise to the party, with whom he accorded in views and principles, the support of his active co-operation to terminate the great contest (F). In offering his mediation to the Powers, he determined upon the effort most painful to his heart—an appeal to the courage and patriotism of his people. The Congress proposed by both parties, assembled in the midst of military preparations, which the success of negotiations would render useless, were the Emperor's wishes realized, but would in a contrary case lead by new efforts to the pacific result which his Majesty preferred obtaining without effusion of blood (G). —By obtaining from the confidence placed in his Imperial Majesty the consent for that prolongation of the armistice which France judged necessary for the negotiations, the Emperor acquired, with the proof of their pacific views, that of the moderation of their principles and of their intentions (H). —In them he acknowledged his own, and from that moment persuaded himself that it would be from their side he would meet with sincere dispositions to concur in the re-establishment of a solid and durable peace. —France, from manifesting analogous intentions, gave but general assurances, too frequently contradicted by public declarations, which gave no hope that she would make those sacrifices for peace that would be sufficient to bring it back to Europe (I). —The proceedings of the Congress could leave no doubt in this respect; the delay in the arriving of the French Plenipotentiaries, under pretext which the great end of its assembling ought to render nugatory (J). —The insufficiency of their instructions upon objects of form, which caused an irreparable loss of time, when a few days only remained for the most important of negotiations (K); all those circumstances united, but too clearly demonstrated that a peace, such as Austria and the allied Sovereigns desired, was foreign to the wishes of France (L); and that having accepted, for

form's sake, and in order not to be exposed to the reproach of the prolongation of the war, her proposition for a negotiation, she wished to elude the effect of it (M); or, perhaps, take advantage of it to separate Austria from the Powers which were already united with her by principle, even before treaties had consecrated their union for the cause of peace and the happiness of the world (N).—Austria came out of this negotiation, the results of which deceived her dearest wishes, with a conscientiousness of the good faith which she carried to it.—More zealous than ever for the noble end which she proposed, she only takes arms for the purpose of attaining, in concert with the Powers animated by similar sentiments, always equally disposed to lend her hand to the re-establishment of an order of things, which, by a wise division of forces, will place the guarantee of peace under the shield of an association of independent States, she will neglect no opportunity of arriving at this result, and the knowledge she has acquired of the dispositions of the Courts become henceforth allies, gives her the certainty that they will sincerely co-operate in so salutary a design (O).—In declaring by the Emperor's orders, to the Count de Narbonne, that his functions as Ambassador ceases from this moment. The undersigned places at his Excellency's disposition, the requisite passports for himself and suite.—Similar passports shall be sent to Ade la Blanche, Charge d'Affairs from Vienna, as well as to the other individuals of the embassy.—He has the honour of offering, &c.

(Signed) METTERNICH.

Prague, 12th Aug. 1813.

NOTES.

Note A.—Austria has, with full consent, renounced the Empire of Germany; she has acknowledged the Princes of the Confederation; she has acknowledged the Protectorate of the Emperor. If the Cabinet has conceived the design of re-establishing the Empire of Germany, of reversing every thing that victory has founded and treaties consecrated, it has conceived a design *which but ill proves the spirit of moderation, and the respect for the rights of independent States, with which it professes to be animated.*

Note B.—The Cabinet of Vienna forgets the treaty of alliance which it concluded on the 14th of March, 1812; it forgets that, by this treaty, France and Austria reciprocally guaranteed the integrity of the exist-

ing territories; it forgets that, by this treaty, Austria engaged to defend the territory of France as it then existed, and which has not since received any enlargement; it forgets that, by this treaty, it did not limit itself to demand for Austria the integrity of her territory, but the aggrandisements which circumstances might procure to her; it forgets that, on the 14th of March, 1812, all the questions from which the war originated were known and fixed, and that it was voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the cause, that it took part against Russia. Why, if it had been the sentiments which it at present avows, did it not then make common cause with Russia? Why, at least, instead of uniting itself with what it now represents as an unjust cause, did it not remain neutral? Prussia, at the same time, made an alliance with France, which she violated afterwards, but her fortresses and her territory were occupied. Placed between two great Powers in arms, and in the theatre of war, neutrality was impossible, and she took part with the strongest side. When, afterwards, Russia occupied her territory, she received the law, and became the ally of Russia. None of those circumstances which regulated the determinations of Prussia existed in 1812, nor do they exist in 1813, with respect to Austria. She engaged with full consent in 1812, in the cause which she believed the most just, and that of which the triumph was most important to her views and the interests of Europe, of which she has shewn herself so restless a protector and so warlike a defender. She has shed her blood to support the cause of France, and in 1813 she lavishes it to support the contrary side.—What must the people think? What judgment must they form of a Government which, attacking to-day what it defended yesterday, shews that it is neither justice nor policy which regulates the most important determinations of its Cabinet.

Note C.—The French Cabinet knows better than any other, that Austria, whenever the hope of obtaining it was not conceived; it knows that if any thing could have inclined it to war, it was the certainty that Austria would not only take no part against it, but that it would take part for it. It knows that far from disadvising the war, Austria excited it; that far from fearing it, she desired it. She knows that far from wishing to oppose new divisions of States, she conceived new dismemberments by which she hoped to profit.

Note D.—The Cabinet of Vienna could

not, it is said, maintain a neutrality in the midst of the vast field of battle which surrounded it on all sides. Were not circumstances, then, the same in 1806? Were not sanguinary battles fought in 1806 and 7 near the limits of her territory, and did she not still preserve to her people the benefits of peace, and maintain a happy neutrality? But the Government of Austria, in taking part in the war, and combating in the cause of France, *consulted*, it is said, *its fidelity to relations newly established*; a fidelity which no longer deserves to be consulted, when those relations become older by a year, and more strict by a former alliance; if we may now believe it was not to ensure to itself its aggrandisements that in 1812 it allied itself to France, which guaranteed all its possessions and took part in the war, it was to promote the return of peace, and to cause the councils of wisdom and prudence to be listened to. What logic! what modesty!

Note E.—How did the Cabinet of Vienna learn that the brilliant successes of the campaign of 1812 did not bring back to moderation the councils of the French Government? If it had been well informed, it would have known that the counsels of France, after the battle of the Moskwa, were moderate and pacific, and that every thing which could restore peace was then tried.

Note F.—The Cabinet of Vienna continues its error. It made common cause with France in 1812, and it now says, that it was to prevent her from making war against Russia. It arms in 1813 in favour of Russia and Prussia, and this, it says, is to inspire them with the desire of peace. These Powers, at first elevated by some success, which they owed to the chance of circumstances, were restored to more calm sentiments by the striking reverse of the first month of the campaign. Enfeebled, vanquished, they were about to recover from their illusions. The Austrian Government declared that it would arm in their behalf; and shewed them its arms ready to be taken up in their defence. By thus offering them new chances in the continuation of the war it pretends to inspire them with the desire of peace. What else could it have done, if it had wished to encourage them to war?—It has offered to Russia to take upon itself the burden of it; it has offered to Prussia to change the theatre of the war. It has called upon its own territory the troops of its allies, and all the calamities which weighed upon that of Prus-

sia. It has, in fine, offered to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the spectacle most agreeable to an Emperor of Russia—that of Austria, her natural enemy, fighting against France, her actual enemy. If the Cabinet of Vienna had asked advice of true wisdom, it would have known that a conflagration is not to be extinguished by affording it new aliment; that it is not wise to endanger ourselves for a nation whose interests are contrary or foreign; in fine, that it is folly to expose to all the chances of war a nation which, after such long continued misfortune, might continue to enjoy the sweets of peace. but ambition is not a counsellor which wisdom acknowledges.

Note G.—The author of this declaration cannot get out of the vicious circle in which he is bewildered. Russia and Prussia knew very well that the Austrian Government was arming against France. From that moment they could not wish for peace.—This result of the dispositions of the Cabinet of Vienna was too evident not to be reckoned upon.

Note H.—The Cabinet of Vienna had caused the whole month of June to be lost. Any of the formalities which should have preceded the opening of the congress, France did not solicit that the armistice should be prolonged, but she consented to it. What she wished, and what she asked, was, that the negotiations should be continued during hostilities. But the Cabinet of Austria refused this. Austria would have bound as mediatrix, during the negotiations, and she preferred a prolongation of the armistice, which would give her time to finish her armaments; and of which the limited duration offered a fatal term for breaking off the negotiations, and declaring herself.

Note I.—How was the Cabinet of Vienna assured that France would not bring to the peace those sacrifices which might restore it to Europe. Before the moment which it had fixed for war, did it propose any ultimatum, and distinctly make known what it wished? It declared war because it wished for war. It declared it without examining whether it could be avoided, and with a precipitation, in which it is difficult to recognize the influence of the councils of wisdom.

Note J.—It was by the act of Austria and the Allies that the arrival of Plenipotentiaries was retarded. Yet the difficulties raised by design, were not removed when the Count de Narbonne was already at Prague. His powers, common to the

two Plenipotentiaries, authorized him to act jointly or separately. The Duke de Vicenza arrived later, because new difficulties, by which the dignity of France was compromised, were raised by the enemy. But what signify these observations? What would a delay of a few days have been to a mediator who did not wish for war? and what a motive for war is a delay of a few days.

Note K.—The Plenipotentiaries had for their instructions to adhere to all the forms of negotiation, consecrated by custom. The mediator proposed unusual forms, and such as tended to prevent all approach of the Plenipotentiaries on either side, all accommodation, and all negotiation. He introduced a discussion, which no negociator, with a sincere desire of peace, would ever have started. *There remained*, said he, *but a few days for the most important of negotiations.* Why did there remain only a few days? What had the armistice in common with the negotiation? Was it not possible to negotiate fighting? What signifies a few days more or less, when a treaty of peace is in question? If the Cabinet of Vienna did not wish to negotiate, but to dictate, as conditions are dictated to a besieged place, a few days might, indeed, suffice; but, then, why did it not propose a capitulation?—*There only remained a few days for the most important of negotiations.*—What negotiation, then, is that which can be concluded in a few days? Time may be necessary, when satisfactory explanation is wished; but it is useless to a Mediator, who has taken his determination beforehand. However, when it is against France, some days, more or less, may be allowed to think of it.

Note L.—We must here do justice to the penetration of the Cabinet of Vienna. No doubt a peace such as the Allied Sovereigns desired was foreign to the wishes of France, in like manner as such a peace as France could approve must have been contrary to the wishes of the Allies. Every Power that enters into negotiation, wishes for all that it can obtain; but when there is a mediator, he interposes between these contrary wishes. But such was not the part which the Austrian Cabinet had assigned itself. It never was a mediator, it was an enemy from the time when, according to its own confession, it wished no other peace than that which was wished by one only of the parties. But what was the peace which the Cabinet of Vienna wished? If it really wished peace, a peace of any

kind, why did it not explain itself? Why? because it had adopted all the pretensions of Russia, of Prussia, and of England, and because it had besides pretensions of its own, on which it did not wish to give way, because it had resolved on war.

Note M.—France proposed the meeting of a Congress, because she sincerely wished peace, because she flattered herself that her Plenipotentiaries, when in the presence of those of Russia and Prussia, would come to an understanding; because a Congress, even under the mediation of Austria, would be a means to escape the dangers of the insinuations which the Cabinet of Vienna circulated.—France accepted the mediation of Austria, because, supposing in the Cabinet of Vienna the ambitious views of which we had no doubt, it was to be believed that it would find itself cramped by its part of mediator, and would not dare, in a public negotiation undertaken for its sole interest, to reject our moderate views and the sacrifices which we were disposed to make for peace; because, in fine, if it had been otherwise, and if the mediator and our enemies had been agreed on their reciprocal pretensions, the Cabinet of Vienna would propose an ultimatum which would excite the indignation of France and her Allies.

Note N.—*Austria then was already united in principle with the enemies of France.* Who required from her this confession?—The Cabinet of Vienna feared lest France should prevail in a negotiation to separate Austria from her powerful enemies. No doubt, if Austria had united with them to prevent their making peace, and with the firm resolution of making war against us, she must have feared a negotiation in which our moderation might have offered them more advantageous chances in peace than in war; but why, then, did the Cabinet of Vienna offer its mediation, and cause Europe to resound with its wishes for peace?

Note O.—*Austria wishes to establish an order of things, which, by a wise distribution of forces, places the guarantee of peace under the Ægis of an association of independent States.* She will not make peace till an equal distribution of forces shall guarantee the independence of each State. To obtain this, she ought immediately to aggrandize, at her own expense, Bavaria and Saxony; for the great powers must descend, in order that the weaker powers may become their equals. When it shall have given that example, it will have a right to demand that it shall be imi-

tated. Thus the Cabinet of Vienna wishes to fight to render all powers a republic of Sovereigns, the elements of which shall be perfectly equal; and is it to such reveries that the repose of the world is to be sacrificed? Can public reason, and the opinion of Europe be more openly sported with? In drawing up manifestoes, as well as in the regulation of its conduct, the Cabinet of Vienna has not *listened to the councils of wisdom.*

The following letter from the Duke of Bassano, was in consequence of one from Count Metternich, stating, that he received notes from the Russian and Prussian Ambassadors, declaring the Congress to be at an end, in consequence of the time for which the Armistice had been made, having expired:—

Note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Metternich.

The undersigned Minister for Foreign Affairs, has placed before his Majesty the Emperor and King the declaration of the 11th August, by which Austria throws off the mask of mediator, with which she covered her designs.—Since the month of July, the hostile dispositions of the Cabinet of Vienna towards France, were known to all Europe. Denmark, Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Naples, and Westphalia have in their Archives documents which prove, how much Austria, under the false appearances of the interest she took for her ally, and the love of peace, nourished jealousy against France.—The undersigned refuses to retrace the system of protestations lavished on one side, and insinuations spread upon the other, by which the Cabinet of Vienna compromised the dignity of its Sovereign, and which in its development, what is most sacred among men, a mediator, a congress, and the name of peace.—If Austria wished to make war, what occasion had she to clothe herself in false language, and surround France with snares so badly contrived, that they were evident to every body?—If the Mediator wished for peace, would he have pretended, that so complicated transactions could have been accomplished in fifteen or twenty days? Was that a pacific disposition which consisted in dictating peace to France in less

time than would have been requisite for concluding the capitulation of a besieged place? The peace of Teschen required more than four months' negotiations; more than six weeks were employed in that of Sistow, before even the discussions respecting the forms were terminated; the negotiation for the peace of Vienna, when the greater part of the Austrian monarchy was in the hands of France, lasted two months.

—In the different transactions, the interests and the number of the parties were circumscribed, and when at Prague, the point was to lay down the basis of a general pacification, to *conciliate the interests* of France, of Austria, of Russia, of Prussia, of Denmark, of Saxony, and so many other powers; when to the complications which arose out of the multiplicity and the diversity of interests, were joined the difficulties resulting from the open and concealed pretensions of the Mediator, it was derisive to pretend that every thing should be terminated in fifteen days. Without the fatal intervention of Austria, peace would at this present time have been concluded between Russia, France, and Prussia.—Austria, an enemy to France, and covering her ambition with the mask of Mediatrice, complicated every thing, and rendered all conciliation impossible. But Austria, having declared war, is in a more true and quite simple position. Europe is thus nearer peace; there is one complication less.—The undersigned has therefore received orders to propose to Austria to immediately adopt the means of arriving at peace, of opening a Congress, where all the powers, great or small, shall be called; where all questions shall be solemnly debated; where it shall not be demanded that this work, as difficult as it is salutary, be terminated either in a week or a month; where they shall pursue with that leisure, inseparable from every operation of that nature, with the gravity which belongs to so great interests and so great ends. The negotiations should be long; they must be so. Were the Treaties of Utrecht, of Nimwegen, of Ryswick, of Aix-la-Chapelle, concluded, in a few days?—In the greater part of memorable discussions, the question of peace was always independent of that of war; they negotiated without knowing whether they would fight or not; and since

(To be continued.)